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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
ATTORNEYS--DISBARMENT-AUTHORITY OF COURT.-Alex Berg, of St. Louis,
was kidnapped and held for ransom. Paul Richards accepted the position of
go-between and attorney for Berg. The kidnappers delivered Berg's $50,000
note to Richards for collection agreeing to pay him $10,000 for his services.
The note was never paid. The kidnappers were apprehended. Richards
was indicted for kidnapping but was acquitted. The grievance committees
of the St. Louis and Missouri bar associations filed a verified complaint in the
Supreme Court of Missouri to disbar Richards. Held: Such conduct renders
an attorney unfit to engage in the practice of law. Suspension would be
inadequate. Respondent was, therefore, removed from the practice of law
in the courts of Missouri and his license was revoked. In Re Richards (Mo.
1933) 63 S. W. (2) 672.
This unanimous decision of the Court sitting in bane is of inestimable
significance. Previous Missouri decisions, if foll6wed, would have compelled
the discharge of Richards. State ex, rel. Selleck v. Reynolds (1913) 252 Mo.
369, 158 S. W. 671; Jones v. Sanderson (1921) 287 Mo. 176; 229 S. W. 1087.
Previous decisions have invariably had at least one dissent and often the
majority agreed in result only; most of the doubt revolved about either the
right of the court to take original jurisdiction in such proceedings or the
interpretation of the statutory reasons for suspension or disbarment.
The court held that it has original jurisdiction in disbarment proceedings,
citing State ex rel. Selleck v. Reynolds, supra, and In Re Sizer and Gardner
(1923) 300 Mo. 369, 254 S. W. 82, and that the power, independent of express
constitutional or statutory grant, existed in the judicial branch of the govern-
ment. Thus the inherent power of the court to admit and disbar was af-
firmed conclusively. This is in accord with the great weight of authority,
viz., the function is a judicial one and not legislative; while the legislature
may regulate the power it does not create it and cannot frustrate or destroy it.
2 R. C. L. 1086; 6 C. J. 580. The primary purpose of disbarment proceed-
ings is protection of the courts and of the public generally, and not punish-
ment. It is to preserve a standard of integrity and honesty so that the court
and its officers may be free from all suspicion. This is absolutely essen-
tial if the judiciary is to function and dispense justice properly. Nearly a
century and a half ago Lord Mansfield, in Ex parte Brounsall (1778) 2 Cowp.
Eng. 829, 98 Eng. Rep. 1385, held that an attorney who had been convicted of
a felony should have his name stricken from the roll; that the question was
not one of punishment but "whether after the conduct of this man it is
proper that he should stand free from all suspicion." In the principal case
the court held the proceedings to be neither civil nor criminal, but sui generis,
so that Richards could not complain that the Supreme Court had only ap-
pellate jurisdiction.
It was contended, upon the authority of State ex rel. Selleck v. Reynolds,
supra, and Jones v. Sanderson, supra, that where the offense charged in dis-
barment proceedings is an indictable one the defendant cannot be disbarred
or suspended unless indicted and convicted and that the record of the court
having charge of the criminal trial is conclusive upon the court hearing the
disbarment proceedings and constitutes a valid defense. The Selleck de-
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cision was by a bare majority of the court while the Jones opinion was
based upon the precedent of the former. As the court in the principal case
clearly shows the Selleck case was decided upon statutes which were repealed
by the legislature in 1919. These statutes, R. S. Mo. (1909) sees. 956-960,
provided that the court should have power only to suspend an accused from
practice until the facts were ascertained in the criminal trial; the record of
conviction or acquittal should be conclusive of the facts. The majority in the
Selleck case interpreted these provisions to mean that an acquittal compelled
the court to dismiss the disbarment proceedings. In 1919 what is now
R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 11712, was enacted to replace the "excuse for this judicial
aberration." It provides, "If the attorney be acquitted or discharged upon
his trial . . . the Court shall forthwith hear the evidence offeied in sup-
port of said charge and the evidence offered by the accused, and shall de-
termine the matter without delay."
The Richards decision, even had the 1909 statutes been in effect, would
have been the same for the court says, "any statutory enactment under-
taking to make an acquittal in a criminal prosecution a bar to such an in-
vestigation would be, as heretofore suggested, an unconstitutional en-
croachment of the legislative upon the judicial department of government.
. . . it certainly does not follow that after acquittal thereon these same
acts may not be charged and proved as reasons for disbarment if they in
fact show that respondent is unfit to continue in the practice of the law."
Generally the statutory grounds of disbarment are not exclusive and in those
states where the legislature has attempted to specify causes for disbarment
it is the rule that the courts may suspend or remove for other causes than
those mentioned in the statute. 2 Thornton, Attorneys at Law, 759 and cases
cited.
This declaration of the Supreme Court of Missouri that it has inherent
power to disbar any attorney, regardless of statute, for any conduct that
renders him unfit for the proper performance of his duties as an officer of
court is a great step forward. It is at least a healthy tendency toward the
development of the bar on a higher ethical plane. S. M., '34.
BANKS AND BANKING-DEPOSIT OF CHECK INDORSED IN BLANK-EFECT OF
INSOLVENCY OF COLLECTING BANK.-A bank accepted for deposit from the
payee, giving immediate credit therefor, a check drawn by a loan association
on another bank, and indorsed by payee in blank. The first bank subse-
quently failed to open for business, and depositor instructed the loan associa-
tion to stop payment on the check. The bank now sues to recover the amount
thereof. Held: Reversing the decision of the Springfield Court of Appeals
(1932) 52 S. W. (2d) 608, for the loan association, on the ground that the
Bank Collection Code made the bank only an agent of the depositor, who
could therefore at any time revoke the agency, stop payment on the check,
and himself collect directly from the other bank. Farmers Exchange Bank
of Marshfield v. Farm & Home Savings & Loan Assn. of Missouri (Mo., 1933)
61 S. W. (2d) 717.
The common law rule according to "the great weight of authority sup-
ports the proposition that when a customer presents a check or draft to the
bank for deposit, non-restrictively indorsed, and the bank gives him credit
therefor, prima facie, the bank becomes the owner of the instrument and the
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